Syrian security forces stand guard outside al-Aqtan prison, where some Islamic State detainees are held, in Raqqa, Syria, Jan. 23, 2026. Photo: REUTERS/Karam al-Masri

While Israel has focused much of its security attention on Iran and its regional proxies such as Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic State (IS) has quietly intensified its campaign against the Jewish state, mounting an unprecedented wave of plots and attempted attacks that has largely escaped international attention.

According to a database compiled by Aaron Zelin, a senior research fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Israeli security forces have disrupted more plots by the jihadist terror group since the Hamas-led invasion of and massacre across southern Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, than during the entire nine-and-a-half years preceding it.

Between 2014 and 2023, Israeli forces conducted 50 IS-related arrest operations, compared with 46 in the period since the Oct. 7 atrocities, marking a significant surge in the group’s attempted attacks and operational activity.

Even though IS has been more active against Israel over the past three years than ever before, experts warn that its growing threat has been largely overlooked, with government officials concentrating their attention on Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” amid escalating regional tensions.

In his report for MBN Magazine, Zelin explains that IS’s plots have grown increasingly sophisticated, evolving from mostly involving individuals seeking to join the group’s ranks in Syria or disseminating propaganda online to more direct, coordinated, and ambitious efforts to plan and execute attacks.

Before the start of the war in Gaza, just 18 of the documented operations involved suspected attack plots, compared with 28 of the 46 operations recorded since Oct. 7, 2023, reflecting a shift toward planning and preparing attacks on Israeli soil rather than focusing primarily on online radicalization and recruitment.

“Few people have noticed this uptick in activity because almost none of these plots succeeded, which reflects Israeli intelligence successes more than IS restraint,” Zelin writes. “Nor are these plots simply the work of isolated sympathizers. A significant share can be traced back to IS networks abroad, especially in Syria.”

Last year, Israeli intelligence officials warned of a rising threat level linked to IS activity inside Israeli territory following the outbreak of the war, signaling that the group was becoming an increasingly serious security concern even as Israel grappled with threats on multiple fronts.

In one of several thwarted terror plots, Israeli security forces arrested two young men in the East Jerusalem neighborhood of Ras al-Amud after uncovering a plot to pack a truck with gas canisters and blow it up near the Israeli parliament.

In another foiled attack, Israeli authorities uncovered a four-member cell near Hebron, in the southern West Bank, whose leader was in contact with IS operatives abroad and whose members had assembled approximately 100 explosive devices to target Israeli soldiers.

“By stopping these plots, Israel’s security services have kept IS’s campaign largely invisible. That success should not be mistaken for the absence of a threat,” Zelin argues.

The new report notes that approximately two-thirds of the cases recorded since the Oct. 7 massacre involved Arab citizens of Israel rather than Palestinians from the West Bank or East Jerusalem, with at least nine cases involving minors, including a child as young as 14.

As the regional security landscape grows increasingly volatile, Zelin explains that IS’s leadership has sought to capitalize on the escalating tensions to advance its campaign of violence, calling for attacks against Jewish communities, synagogues, and Israeli embassies worldwide while urging Palestinians to abandon Hamas and join the group instead.

For example, IS spokesman Abu Hudhayfa al-Ansari previously called on Palestinians to turn against Hamas and fight “the Jews because they are Jews,” while encouraging supporters to kill Jews and Christians “in the streets and alleyways” of the West.

Following the Israel-Hamas ceasefire last year, Zelin notes that IS has sought to present itself as a small but uncompromising force leading the “coming religious wars,” while telling Palestinians that jihad, rather than the “path of national liberation,” represents their only salvation.

“With Hamas bound by a truce, IS has sought to present itself as the group still committed to fighting Israel,” Zelin writes.

He also points to several prominent pro-IS voices who reportedly urged their followers in Gaza to stay out of Hamas’s confrontation with Israel and instead stockpile weapons, establish cells, and pledge allegiance to IS when a broader regional war erupted.

With infiltration into Israel posing significant challenges, the report explains, IS has increasingly turned to recruits already inside the country, relying on overseas operatives to provide the instructions, contacts, and logistical support needed to plan attacks.

Under this strategy, IS seeks to target first what it considers Israel’s “protectors,” including Arab governments, Gulf states hosting US military bases, and Jewish communities abroad, in an effort to widen the conflict and weaken the regional and international actors standing in the way of its jihadist ambitions.

Even though many of the terror plots involved teenagers radicalized online, the report finds that more than a third of the suspects had direct contact with IS operatives abroad or were attempting to reach areas where the group operates, with some receiving direct assistance from its overseas networks.

In his assessment, Zelin stresses the need for the United States and Israel to treat IS as a distinct threat in the Israeli-Palestinian arena, rather than viewing it through the broader framework of Hamas and Iran’s network of regional proxies.

With a particular focus on Syria, Zelin argues that Washington and Jerusalem should pressure Damascus to dismantle IS networks facilitating operations inside Israel, coordinate those efforts with Israeli security operations, and strengthen intelligence-sharing to track recruitment routes through Turkey and Jordan used by would-be fighters.

“Gaza’s postwar order also matters. Any stabilization or security framework for Gaza should include vetting and monitoring for jihadi activity so that a weakened Hamas does not leave space for IS,” he says.