Mahmoud al-Aloul, Vice Chairman of the Central Committee of Palestinian organization and political party Fatah, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi, and Mussa Abu Marzuk, senior member of the Palestinian terror movement Hamas, attend an event at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse in Beijing on July 23, 2024. Photo: Pedro Pardo/Pool via REUTERS

On Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas launched a surprise attack on southern Israel. For Israel, it was the deepest national crisis since the Yom Kippur War of October 1973, and like that war, it reshaped the strategic order of the Middle East.

What followed was a series of conflicts. Israel fought Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon. By June 2025 the confrontation reached Iran, where Israel struck its nuclear and military sites. On Feb. 28, 2026, a joint American-Israeli campaign killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and Iran retaliated with attacks on Israel and Gulf states.

These conflicts have divided Israel’s partners into those who stood firm and those whose friendship proved conditional. Among these countries, China — Israel’s largest partner in Asia — presents the sharpest contrast. Its conduct since Oct. 7 can be summed up as “distance in diplomacy and proximity in commerce.” That formula has served Beijing’s interests well, but not so much Israel’s.

Proximity in Commerce, Distance in Diplomacy

Formal Sino-Israeli diplomatic relations date to Jan. 24, 1992, when bilateral commerce stood at about US $50 million. By 2018, trade had reached US$11.6 billion, up from US$1 billion in 2001.

Chinese firms entered AI, semiconductors and communications networks, and Chinese investment deals peaked at 76 that year. In 2025, imports from China crossed US $14.7 billion, while exports to China stood at about US $2.8 billion, a deficit of nearly US$12 billion. The war did nothing to dent this; Israel continues to buy ever more from China.

Politically, Beijing’s posture was calculated from the beginning. Its statement on Oct. 8, 2023, urged restraint but did not name Hamas. On Oct. 9, Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning said China had always been on the side of equity and justice. The Chinese position was not well-received in Israel. In mid-October, Foreign Minister Wang Yi told his Saudi counterpart that Israel’s response in Gaza had gone beyond the scope of self-defense.

In July 2024, Beijing hosted 14 Palestinian factions, including Hamas and Fatah, and announced an agreement on an interim government for post-war Gaza. Hosting armed non-state actors confers the legitimacy such groups crave. In May 2025, according to media reports, China’s ambassador to Israel, Xiao Junzheng, clarified that China opposes and condemns what Hamas did on Oct. 7. But in November 2025, when the UN Security Council adopted the American Gaza plan, China abstained, arguing that it failed to reflect the principle of “Palestinians governing Palestine.”

The Iran Factor

When it comes to Iran, Israel’s principal adversary, the pattern is sharper. China is Iran’s largest trading partner and buys about 90 percent of its oil exports.

After Israel struck Iran in June 2025, Wang Yi told Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar that China firmly opposes Israel’s use of force. In September 2025, Prime Minister Netanyahu told American state legislators in Jerusalem that Israel faced a siege organized by a few states: “One is China and the other is Qatar.” By May 2026 he went further, telling CBS that China had supplied components for Iran’s missile production, a claim Beijing rejected. Israel’s leadership, it seems, has few illusions about China’s double game.

That game was on full display after the February 2026 strikes that killed Khamenei. China’s Foreign Ministry condemned the attack as a grave violation of Iran’s sovereignty. When Iran retaliated against Arab states, Beijing said it “does not go along with attacks on Gulf countries,” and Wang Yi urged Tehran to heed its neighbors’ legitimate concerns.

Israel, also under Iranian fire, received no such consideration. Even China’s sympathy for the Gulf had limits: in March, it abstained on Bahrain’s Security Council resolution against Iran’s attacks, saying the text did not “fully reflect the root cause” — a pointed reference to the US-Israeli strikes.

Selective Principles

In March 2025, Ambassador Xiao Junzheng said the Gaza war was “not the theme of Israel-China relations,” signaling that bilateral ties should operate independently of third-party considerations and conflicts. Yet when Knesset members met Taiwan’s president in May 2026, the Chinese embassy accused them of gravely violating the One-China principle and undermining the political foundation of ties. Put simply, for Beijing, third-party issues are irrelevant when they concern Israel, and foundational when they concern China.

There is a clear asymmetry at the heart of Sino-Israeli relations, most evident since October 2023. In its dealings with Israel, China has retained its market access, its technology partnerships, and its standing in the Global South. Israel, meanwhile, has been left with a widening trade deficit and political neutrality that arrives with invoices. 

The author is a Delhi-based strategic affairs analyst specializing in foreign policy and geoeconomics of Middle East.