Britain’s Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband speaks at the House of Commons in London, Britain, Sept. 8, 2026. Photo: HOUSE OF COMMONS/Handout via REUTERS

The foreign ministers of the United Kingdom, France, Canada, and several other European nations recently announced sanctions, or plans for future sanctions, on goods originating in Israeli communities in the West Bank/Judea and Samaria.

According to a statement published by the group, this extreme step is necessary because the chances of a two-state solution are slipping away.

Faced with settler violence and the growth of Jewish communities across the territory, these foreign ministers apparently believe the best way to save the two-state solution is to penalize Israeli citizens and companies operating beyond the Green Line.

Setting aside questions about the prevalence of settler violence or the impact of growing settlements on the future of the territory, there is a more fundamental question these politicians need to answer: Will the punitive measures they have chosen actually bring a two-state solution any closer?

Are they an annoyance to Israel and the Israeli government? Certainly.

Will they change Israeli policy toward the West Bank? Unclear.

But even if Israel were to drastically change its policies because of these sanctions, would a two-state solution suddenly materialize? Doubtful.

That is because, in announcing these measures, these countries have concentrated almost entirely on finding fault with Israel while ignoring the radicalism, corruption, and violence that permeate the Palestinian Authority (PA).

It takes two sides to reach a peaceful resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Yet by focusing solely on perceived Israeli failings, the foreign ministers of the United Kingdom, France, Canada, and their European counterparts have shown themselves to be unserious advocates for peace.

Instead, they are promoting one-sided measures that will do little to advance a resolution while allowing Western politicians to present themselves as being at the forefront of international diplomacy.

If these countries truly cared about advancing a two-state solution, as they claim, they would also take a serious look at sanctioning the PA.

After all, if sanctions are warranted over the violent actions of a small number of Israeli citizens and the growth of Jewish communities in Judea and Samaria because these are supposedly grave obstacles to peace, what about the PA’s own actions?

The PA continues to subsidize the families of terrorists and imprisoned terrorists. It promotes violent indoctrination through official institutions. It suffers from rampant corruption, lacks functioning democratic institutions, represses political opponents, and has a long history of sabotaging efforts to reach an agreement with Israel.

Surely these are also impediments to any future peace.

If a two-state solution remains possible at all in a post-Oct. 7 world, it will only emerge after difficult discussions with both Israelis and Palestinians.

These sanctions do the exact opposite.

Rather than creating a process in which both sides are forced to confront difficult realities and negotiate seriously, these Western governments remove agency from the Palestinians while placing virtually all responsibility for the conflict on Israel.

That distortion serves little purpose beyond soothing the consciences of politicians who can then claim they are advancing the cause of peace without demanding anything meaningful from one of the parties supposedly required to make that peace possible.

Sanctions against Israeli settlements are not responsible statecraft. They are political theater.

Instead of bringing a peaceful resolution to the conflict any closer, the actions of the UK, France, Canada, and other Western governments risk doing the opposite: rewarding Palestinian intransigence, hardening positions, and helping entrench the conflict for years to come.

The author is a contributor to HonestReporting, a Jerusalem-based media watchdog with a focus on antisemitism and anti-Israel bias — where a version of this article first appeared.