Shiite Muslims raise their hands and chant slogans in support of Iran during a religious procession on the fourth day of Safar in Magam, Budgam, Jammu and Kashmir, India, July 19, 2026. Photo: Adil Abass/ZUMA Press Wire via Reuters Connect

IRAN — Across the Middle East, the regional network of terrorist proxies that Iran spent decades building is now facing unprecedented strain. Israel has tied its withdrawal from southern Lebanon to the disarmament of Hezbollah. In Gaza, negotiations over a political settlement have stalled over when and how Hamas will surrender its weapons. In Yemen, renewed Houthi attacks and military movements against international shipping and Saudi oil facilities have prompted concerns over a return to large-scale conflict.

Together, along with other militias embedded in countries throughout the region, these Islamist organizations form core components of what Tehran calls its “Axis of Resistance” against Israel and US influence, a network that, until the past two years, has allowed the Iranian regime to confront its adversaries without relying on its own military forces.

However, Iran’s revolutionary, anti-Western project did not stop at the borders of the Arab world. As the late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder of Iran’s authoritarian, Islamist regime said in one of his speeches, “When we say that we want to export our revolution, the very meaning is how Islam is implemented here in Iran; we want to implement it everywhere.”

Across Pakistan and parts of India, particularly the Shia-populated districts of Kashmir and Ladakh, Iran cultivated a different kind of influence. It pushed its ideology through religious education, clerics, political organizations, cultural institutions, translated literature, and the symbolism of “resistance.” Indian-administered Kashmir has long been known as “Little Iran” due to centuries of deep-rooted Persian cultural and religious influence. But the Islamic Republic of Iran has used this connection to foster radicalization in the name of its revolutionary mission.

In Pakistan, that influence later acquired a military dimension through the Zainabiyoun Brigade, an armed militia composed primarily of Pakistani Shia fighters deployed in Syria.

The Algemeiner spoke with Hamza, a progressive Pakistani journalist now based in Europe, about the Zainabiyoun Brigade.

“Most of the fighters come from Pakistan’s impoverished northwestern tribal districts, where radical religious networks wield considerable influence,” he said.

A member of the Zainabiyoun Brigade holding the militia’s flag. Photo: Screenshot

According to Hamza, Iran pays Pakistanis to join the militia, offering recruits an estimated $500 to $700, although he could not confirm the exact amount. Hamza is an ex-Shia Muslim who still deeply cares about his community being abused or taken advantage of by the Iranian government.

The emotional power that Iran continues to exercise in parts of South Asia became visible after Khomeini’s successor, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was killed in US-Israeli strikes in late February. Demonstrators carrying his portraits gathered in Karachi, New Delhi, and Srinagar, while large mourning processions were reported in Kargil.

Such support for Iran came just weeks before Pakistan became the lead mediator in attempting to negotiate a ceasefire and broader truce between the US and Iran. Many Western critics decried the central role of Islamabad, arguing the Pakistani government was more pro-Iran than the “neutral” actor it claimed to be.

However, support for Tehran in Pakistan does not necessarily mean approval of the Islamic Republic’s domestic policies. Some Pakistanis condemn the regime’s repression while backing its opposition to the US and Israel.

“I don’t support Iran because it represses Iranian people and spends money on its proxies, and I don’t want Iran to exert influence in Pakistan; theocracy is incompatible with the modern world,” a Pakistani activist and outspoken critic of Israel told The Algemeiner. “However, I fully support Iran’s anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist positions.”

Although Iran’s transnational agenda constitutes its own form of imperialism — an ideological project that seeks to capture minds through manipulation and a carefully cultivated narrative of victimhood — supporters of the regime in Pakistan and Kashmir focus on the US and Israel, arguing they are the ones with an expansionist vision.

Pakistan’s Revolutionary Connection

The Iranian revolution in 1979 coincided with the rule of General Zia-ul-Haq, a Pakistani general and former president who attempted to Islamize Pakistan’s laws. Pakistani Shia feared that the state was imposing Sunni jurisprudence on the entire Muslim population.

The introduction of compulsory zakat (Islamic tax, according to Sharia law) deductions in 1980 intensified that opposition. Thousands of Shias demonstrated in Islamabad, eventually securing an exemption from the measure. The mobilization established Pakistan’s Shia community as a more organized political force.

The Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqh-e-Jafaria, or TNFJ (Jafaria Shia Movement), had been formed in 1979 to protect the community’s legal rights. Although its emergence was rooted in Pakistani conditions, the success of Iran’s revolution gave its younger members greater confidence that religious activists and clerics could become political actors.

No individual embodied that intersection more clearly than Arif Hussain al Hussaini.

Arif Hussain al Hussaini. Photo: Screenshot

Arif Hussain al-Hussaini: Khomeini’s bridge to Pakistan

In Pakistan, the most influential early representative of Khomeini’s political ideas was Arif Hussain Al-Hussaini, a Shia cleric from the Kurram region who studied in Najaf and Qom.

He assumed the leadership of the TNFJ in the 1980s. Under him, the movement expanded beyond demands concerning Shia jurisprudence and adopted a broader political vocabulary centered on resistance, clerical leadership, Muslim unity, and opposition to foreign domination.

Al-Hussaini didn’t simply follow Khomeini but translated central themes of the Iranian revolution into a Pakistani setting. Rather than appealing exclusively to Shias, he attempted to present his movement as part of a wider Islamic campaign against foreign forces. His speeches, political activity, and relationship with Iran gave the Islamic Republic an identifiable ideological bridge into Pakistan.

Al-Hussaini was gunned down in Peshawar, Pakistan, on Aug. 5, 1988. The precise forces behind his murder remain disputed. His death, however, elevated him as a lasting symbol for sections of Pakistan’s Shia political and religious community.

Portraits of Al-Hussaini and references to his teachings remain prominent in pro-revolutionary Shia circles, serving not merely as memorials but as symbols of Iran’s enduring ideological reach. His legacy helped shape later clerics and organizations that interpreted Pakistani political and sectarian grievances through the revolutionary framework of the Islamic Republic, creating channels through which Tehran’s worldview gained influence inside Pakistan.

From political mobilization to Zainabiyoun

The Syrian civil war created a new stage in Iran’s mobilization of foreign Shia communities. As Tehran intervened to preserve the government of then-President Bashar al-Assad, the Iranian regime’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) recruited fighters from several countries. Afghans were organized into the Fatemiyoun Division, while Pakistani recruits were assigned to the Zainabiyoun Brigade.

Recruitment was frequently presented as a religious mission to defend Shia shrines near Damascus. That message drew upon the powerful symbolism of sacrifice, martyrdom, and the defense of the holy sites.

Gen. Qassem Soleimani (center), who is now deceased but at the time was commander of the Quds Force of Iran’s IRGC, with Shia militias in Syria. Photo: ABN News Agency

Pakistan proscribed Zainabiyoun in 2024 after authorities concluded that its activities threatened the country’s security. The decision added the organization to Pakistan’s list of banned groups and raised concerns about fighters returning from Syria with military training and battlefield experience.

Zainabiyoun represents the clearest documented case in which Iran’s engagement with Pakistani Shias developed into organized military recruitment.

Unarmed Movements Under Iranian Influence

Iran’s influence in Pakistan extends beyond armed groups. A broader network of non-militant religious, political, and student organizations has been shaped, to varying degrees, by the ideology of the Islamic Republic including the Imamia Students Organization (ISO), Jafaria Students Organization (JSO), Majlis Wahdat-e-Muslimeen (MWM), and Tehreek-e-Bedari-e-Ummat-e-Mustafa (TBUM), alongside seminaries led by clerics educated in Iran. The educational networks established by these organizations have proved effective in shaping public support for Iran’s Islamic revolution and disseminating its message.

“I support the Iranian regime because it is the only power standing against the US and Israel,” a housewife and supporter of the Iranian regime, Amal, told The Algemeiner. “I wish and look forward to even a wider and bigger revolution.”

Indian-Administered Kashmir’s enduring connection with Iran

Kashmir’s affinity with Iran is rooted in centuries-old Persian cultural and Shia religious ties. Khomeini’s paternal forefathers lived in India before his grandfather migrated to Iran, giving his family a historical connection to South Asia.

Since the 1979 revolution, sections of Kashmir’s Shia community – particularly in Kargil and parts of the Kashmir Valley – have openly supported Iran’s leadership. That allegiance became visible again during the recent US-Iran war, when thousands joined rallies, carried portraits of Iranian leaders, chanted “Death to the US and Israel,” and held mourning ceremonies for Iran’s leaders who were killed. Some communities also collected cash, gold, and other donations for Iran, demonstrating that their support extended beyond religious symbolism to political solidarity.

The Algemeiner spoke with Kashmiris to learn their views on recent developments in the region.

A Shia Kashmiri student, Ali Sina, said, “I view the Iranian revolution as part of a decolonial movement against the Western imperialism and colonialism. I completely support the Islamic Republic against the West.”

Demonstrators burning American and Israeli flags in Iran. Photo: Screenshot

Iran’s armed partners in Lebanon, Gaza, and Yemen can be measured through missiles, military units, and territory. Its influence in South Asia is more difficult to quantify. It is embedded in institutions, religious education, historical memory, political language, and ideas about resistance.

The US-Israeli war against the Islamic Republic, which began on Feb. 28, has weakened Tehran’s capacity to project military power and further degraded its terrorist proxies across the Middle East. But military losses do not erase an ideology. The clerical educational and political networks that transmit Tehran’s revolutionary worldview – its less visible ideological proxies – remain harder to identify and considerably more difficult to dismantle.